India’s concerns about Starlink are not merely theoretical. Two incidents in November and December 2024 brought the issue into sharp focus, raising questions about the use of satellite communications equipment in Indian territory before the company had received permission to provide commercial services.
On 25 November 2024, the Indian Coast Guard intercepted a Myanmar fishing boat near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands carrying approximately 5,500 kg of methamphetamine, which the government described as its largest-ever drug seizure of this kind. The Defence Ministry’s official account of the operation recorded the recovery of a portable Inmarsat satellite phone.
Subsequent police reporting described a Starlink device among the equipment recovered from the vessel. Investigators suspected that the smugglers had used satellite internet to navigate at sea, and police sought information from SpaceX about the device’s purchaser and registration details. The reported quantity was approximately 6,000 kg, with an estimated value of ₹36,000 crore.
Hindustan Times reported on the suspected use of Starlink for navigation, while Reuters reported on the police demand for information and Musk’s subsequent response.
The distinction between the initial official account and the subsequent police investigation is important. The Coast Guard’s initial statement identified an Inmarsat phone; later reporting described the Starlink equipment. The suspected use of Starlink was an investigative finding, not proof that SpaceX had knowingly assisted criminal activity.
The following month, Indian security forces recovered a device bearing the Starlink logo during an operation in Manipur. The equipment was found alongside weapons and ammunition in a region affected by prolonged ethnic violence and insurgency.
Musk responded on X that Starlink’s satellite beams were turned off over India and had never been active there. His statement was consistent with the fact that Starlink had not been authorised to provide commercial services in the country.
But the issue did not end with that denial.
On 3 January 2025, The Guardian reported that sources from armed groups and law enforcement in Manipur said Starlink devices had been used in several areas to access the internet during government-imposed shutdowns. According to the report, a source linked to the Meitei separatist group People’s Liberation Army said the group had initially used a device in Myanmar and subsequently discovered that it also worked across the border in Manipur.
The newspaper reported that the devices were believed to have been brought into India from Myanmar and that it could not establish how many armed groups had access to the technology.
These reports do not establish that Musk deliberately enabled smugglers or insurgents to use Starlink. Nor do they conclusively establish that the seized equipment was functioning in every reported incident. But they raise questions that a responsible regulator cannot ignore: can unauthorised equipment be activated across borders, can its use be detected, and can access be restricted when a serious security threat emerges?
Those questions are especially relevant to India, which has a long and sensitive international border, faces drug trafficking and insurgency challenges, and must manage communications during emergencies.
Three safeguards are not unreasonable demands
India needs satellite broadband. Remote villages, islands, mountainous regions and areas with limited terrestrial infrastructure could benefit considerably from reliable satellite connectivity. Starlink should have the opportunity to compete for that market.
But commercial access must be accompanied by enforceable safeguards.
First, Indian traffic and data must be handled in accordance with Indian law. India’s Department of Telecommunications specifies requirements for satellite communications services that include routing Indian traffic through gateways established in the country. Its official GMPCS authorisation guidance sets out relevant gateway, privacy and security conditions.
Second, Indian law enforcement and security agencies must have access to lawful interception and monitoring mechanisms. Satellite internet providers should not be exempt from the legal obligations that apply to telecommunications operators merely because their networks use satellites rather than terrestrial towers and cables. Such powers must, in turn, be exercised within the law and subject to appropriate safeguards.
Third, the government must have an effective and legally defined mechanism to restrict or suspend service in a specified area during a genuine emergency, where a lawful order requires it. This is particularly important if satellite connectivity can otherwise bypass a local communications shutdown imposed during serious violence or a security crisis. The precise technical and contractual arrangements needed to achieve this must be established before commercial launch, rather than assumed to exist.
These requirements are not an argument against satellite internet. They are a framework for ensuring that a powerful foreign communications network can operate responsibly within India.
The government must also be transparent about the scope of its demands, protect legitimate user privacy and avoid using shutdown powers arbitrarily. National security should not become a blanket justification for suppressing lawful communication. But neither should the benefits of connectivity be used to dismiss genuine security risks.
That is the balance India must strike.
Welcome Starlink, but on India's terms
Musk’s argument would be stronger if it focused on how Starlink can meet these requirements, improve connectivity and offer Indian consumers a competitive service. Instead, his public attacks have shifted attention towards allegations of political interference for which he has not presented publicly verifiable evidence.
India is not obstructing Starlink simply because it is an American company, nor is it protecting domestic telecom firms from fair competition. The regulatory framework appears to be applied consistently. However, authorities still need to explain the delays more clearly and provide a transparent path to approval.
But a licence to operate in other countries is not a substitute for Indian authorisation. Nor does a company’s technological sophistication give its owner the right to decide which national rules are acceptable.
The question is not whether India should welcome satellite internet. It should. The question is whether India can ensure that a network operating within its borders remains accountable to its laws, including during a national emergency.
Starlink is welcome in India. The price of admission is compliance with India's lawful, transparent and enforceable requirements, just as it would be for any other telecommunications provider.
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